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[ 
It is a pleasure for me to speak this evening before such 
a distinguished group of agribusiness and academic representatives, 
all of whom have a common interest. Twenty years ago, that interes.t 
would have been denominated as "agricultural policy". Today it 
would be called "food policy", which presumably is a broader 
term. Food policy is usually defined to encompass the interests 
of everyone in the production and marketing process from producer 
to consumer. It is by no means limited geographically, but 
encompasses people and firms who are involved -- directly or 
indirectly, domestically and internationally - in the food business. 
Allegedly, this broad definition is required because those who 
worked with agricultural policy a decade or two ago were inordinately 
producer oriented. Perhaps that charge is justified in some 
instances, but in my judgment it was the exception rather than 
the rule. Most agribusiness firms and most agricultural policy 
experts have always sought to balance the interests of all those 
who are intertwined in the food chain. Nevertheless, "food policy" 
is with us for a long time to come, so it behooves all of us 
to become actively involved in developing that policy. 
Hence, let us turn to some of the major issues of the day. 
I will attempt to concentrate on those questions which are of 
direct interest to the agribusiness world, but which also have a 
research or extension component of significance to the academic 
world. For purposes of organization, I will deal first with issues 
that are international in scope, and then those that are primarily 
[I 
domestic in their orientation. 
I. International Food Issues 
A. Food Reserves - As you know, international food 
stocks were drawn down in the 1972-74 period to what many would 
construe as dangerously low levels. This stimulated an ·enormous 
interest in the subject of world hunger. And it also stimulated 
concern about food prices, both here and abroad. The simplistic 
answer offered by most spokesmen on this question is that we 
ought to have an international food reserve. Perhaps these 
spokesmen are correct, but most of them scarcely understand 
the question, let alone the answer! 
If one is to have an international food reserve, one must 
first decide whether its basic objective is one of food security, 
(i.e., having ample food available to provide a nutritionally 
adequate diet to the people of the worl~,, price stability, or 
both. If food security be the sole objective, a reserve need 
not be terribly large. Even in those worrisome days of three 
or four years ago, food supplies were ample to meet the basic 
needs of everyone in this world. Where there people suffering 
from starvation and malnutrition at that time? Of course, but 
this is also true today, when food supplies are abundant, and 
it was true a decade or two ago as well. This is a problem of 
distribution, rather than of supply. As serious as that problem 
may be - and it merits the attention of all of us - it is not a 
problem of food security. 
Most people who advocate creation of an international food 
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reserve really have price stability objectives in mind, though 
they cloak their arguments in terms of food security. The reason 
for this is obvious; opposing a food security program is like 
challenging God and motherhood! Constructing an argument on 
price stability grounds is, on the other hand, another matter 
entirely. Many people are wary of price stabilization programs, 
for they have hardly had a record of unblemished success in the 
past. The International Wheat Agreement, one of our first 
attempts at an international food reserve, collapsed about ten 
years ago, and its pricing provisions have been inactive since 
that time. We sought to achieve price stability throughout our 
entire economy a few years ago when the Cost of Living Counsel 
came into being. But it was a short-lived"institution, and its 
record was mixed at best. 
At the moment, discussions of an international food reserve 
are underway in London, and it is possible that a new agreement 
will be negotiated in 1978. But there are lots of questions 
to be answered before that agreement is finalized. Permit me to 
pose a few of them for you. 
First, a decision must be made as to whether the agreement 
is to include price stability objectives. If so, a secondary 
but critical decision must be made as to whether the agreement 
will have minimum and maximum prices (the position of the European 
Community, for example) or simply price or quantity guidelines or 
triggers (the U.S. position). If a minimum and maximum price are 
to be defended, the spread between those two prices is likewise 
of critical importance. If that spread is relatively wide, only 
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limited price stability will be achieved. But it may be possible 
to carry out those limited objectives with a relatively small 
buffer stock or reserve. If, on the other hand, the difference 
between the minimum and maximum price is narrowed, greater price 
stability can presumably be achieved, but at a much higher cost. 
Defending a narrow price corridor will require a large buffer 
stock, otherwise the risk of failure will be greatly increased. 
A related but critical question in any international food 
reserve is "Who picks up the tab?" In times of surplus, exporters 
assume this financial burden as a matter of course. There is 
no motivation for importers to do so, so long as supplies are 
readily available from a number of sources. Since surpluses have 
been the dominant situation during the post-World War II period, 
importers argue that exporting nations should bear most of the 
financial burden of a formal food reserve. Exporters, on the 
other hand, argue that times are changing, population is increasing, 
and food security could become the world's greatest challenge 
over the next two or three decades. If so, importers should bear 
most of the cost of a formal food reserve. Thus, the negotiating 
lines are drawn, and only time will tell how this financial 
burden will be distributed. 
Management of a food reserve is also a key question. Is this 
function to be centralized, or will each participating nation 
provide its own management? In either case, are management decisions 
to be automatic, in accordance with the rules of the agreement, or is 
there to be some discretion exercised in building and releasing 
stocks? Are the lesser developed nations to become participants in 
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such a program and, if so, how are their financial obligations 
to be met? Will a reserve encompass only food grains (i.e., wheat, 
rice, or both), or will it also include feed grains? Can an 
international food reserve be operated successfully, without the 
cooperation of the Soviet Union? If not, can the Soviets be 
induced to participate by the use of carrot and/or stick provisions 
of the agreement? Are there to be penalties for noncompliance 
with the agreement? If so, how are those penalties to be enforced? 
One could pose a number of additional questions on food 
reserves, but the above should suffice to indicate that this is 
a most complex and intricate question. 
B. International Trade - We are now in the midst of 
the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva, 
Switzerland. This is a ninety nation exercise, the largest of 
its kind in the history of the world. Though innumerable issues 
are involved, a few are worthy of particular attention in the 
context of international food policy. 
One of these, for example, is what kind of ''special and 
differentiated treatment" is to be provided for the lesser 
developed nations under the rules of the GATT (the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)? As you know, foreign aid is no 
longer a popular program here in the United States. Nor is it 
terribly popular in many of the other developed nations of the 
world. How then do we meet our humanitarian obligations to 
the less fortunate nations and peoples of the world? Our usual 
answer is "more trade, less aid". The LDC's have responded by 
saying "Fine, but that is meaningless rhetoric unless you are 
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prepared to open your markets to us". ifuat specific actions 
are we, the developed nations, prepared to take on behalf of our 
less fortunate brethren? Are we, for example, prepared to restrain 
our own use of export subsidies, but permit the LDC's to use 
export subsidies at will? When we. apply "safeguard actions" against 
an influx of foreign imports, are we prepared to exempt the LDC's 
from such actions? When we design a "voluntary restraint program" 
for beef imports, are we prepared to treat the LDC's differently 
from an Australia or a New Zealand? When a tariff formula is 
implemented in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, are we 
prepared to make deeper than formula cuts on products of particular 
interest to the LDC's? Are we prepared to participate in inter-
national commodity agreements on a whole host of products, knowing 
that the LDC's wish to use those agreements to raise the inter-
national prices of their raw materials? Are we prepared to 
bear a significant share of the cost of maintaining buffer stocks 
that are established under international commodity agreements? 
Are we prepared to extend duty free treatmen~ on a whole host of 
agricultural and non-agricultural cor:uuodities under the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) program? 
All of the above questions must be answered by our negotiators, 
and the negotiators of other developed nations, over the next twelve 
to eighteen months. These issues are of immense importance to 
the entire world, for billions of dollars of trade are at stake. 
The Geneva negotiations could well have a more significant impact 
on U.S. agriculture than anything else that takes place in this 
country or abroad during the next twenty or thirty years. What a 
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fertile field this is for academic research as well. Predicting 
the domestic and international impact of these potential changes 
in the structure of international trade is an enticing but tremendously 
formidable task. 
C. Market Development - Aside from what might occur in 
international negotiations, we still have an immediate shortrun 
interest in expanding U.S. agricultural exports. No one in the 
agricultural community is comfortable with the present level of 
carry-over stocks that we have in this country. Farm prices are 
inordinately low, and we need to take whatever actions are 
feasible to correct the situation. Obviously, one way of relieving 
the economic pressure on our agricultural sector is to expand 
exports. This can be done through: (1) combined governmental-
private sector initiatives in market development; (2) expanded 
use of CCC Credit; and (3) increased commitments under P.L. 480, 
the Food for Peace Program. Secretary Bergland is cognizant of 
these possibilities, and has begun to respond to them. He recently 
announced that CCC Credit has been increased from $750,000,000 per 
year to $1.5 billion, and that market development funds in the 
Foreign Agriculture Service will also be increased. This is good 
news, and hopefully the Food for Peace allocations will also be 
expanded. 
Though these short-term actions are most appropriate, it would 
be wise to examine the long-term implications of such programs to 
U.S. agriculture. Are they beneficial? If so, what kind of benefit-
cost return do they provide? Where government funds are involved, 
how does the return on those funds compare to expenditures made on 
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our basic domestic farm programs? P.L. 480, for example, involves 
a combination of grant and loan programs. Should there be more 
grants and fewer loans? Or vice versa? The loans are long·-term, 
at extremely favorable interest rates. Should the term be lengthened 
or shortened? Should the rate of interest be increased or decreased? 
Do P. L. 480 programs inordinately depress agricultural production 
in the recipient countries? Is this advantageous or disadvantageous 
to U.S. farmers? Should we be using P.L. 480 funds to increase 
agricultural production in the lesser developed recipient nations, 
as is present policy, or will this simply make them competitors 
with U.S. agriculture in the future? P.L. 480 programs in Korea, 
Taiwan, and Spain have evolved into excellent corr~ercial markets 
for U.S. farmers. Can this success be duplicated in other lesser 
developed nations of the world? If so, should we be pinpointing 
our P.L. 480 programs toward that market development end? 
We might also ask ourselves whether we can improve our 
commercial sales performance throughout the world. Can we capture 
an increased share of the world market from our competitor exporting 
nations? If so, how do we go about doing so? Is it simply a 
matter of becoming more efficient in our own production and 
marketing processes, thereby enhancing our international competitiveness 
Or is there more to it than that? Do we need to improve our marketing 
techniques? Do we need more sales representatives around the world, 
and a higher level of market intelligence? Do we know how to adjust 
to the cultural requirements of a purchasing nation? Can we achieve 
the salesmanship successes with agricultural products that the 
Japanese and others have achieved with a whole gamut of industrial 
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and commercial goods? Do we have the kind of institutional 
framework that will permit us to dramatically expand our inter-
national sales efforts? 
A decade ago, the above questions might not have been 
considered crucial to the economic well-being of the United States. 
At that time, only four or five percent of our gross national 
product was accounted for by international trade. Though that 
figure has doubled over the past several years, international 
commerce is still not a life or death proposition for us. We 
can maintain a relatively high standard of living for our people 
even if we are singularly unsuccessful in our international 
sales efforts. Nevertheless, those questions are extremely 
critical to U.S. agriculture, which is far more dependent upon 
international trade for its well-being than is our industrial 
sector. And they are becoming more and more important to the 
nation as a whole, with trade becoming an increasingly pervasive 
element of our economic system. Therefore, it behooves us to 
search for answers to these questions at a very early date. 
II. Domestic Food Issues 
Enough on the international side. Let us now turn our 
attention to a few of the most significant domestic food policy 
issues of the day. 
A. Basic Farm Legislation - Though the 1977 Farm Bill 
has now been signed into law, and though it builds on previous 
legislation passed in 1970 and 1973, it is still not well under-
stood. Groups such as yours can play a major role in achieving an 
increased level of understanding of the legislation, and the political-
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economic tradeoffs that are encompassed therein. 
In my judgment, our basic agricultural policy framework is 
sound. I would not trade it for that of any other nation in the 
world. The inuerests of both producers and consumers are balanced 
in the system of target p~ices, loan rates, set aside programs, 
etc. that are built into our present law. But there is still a 
lot of unrest. The unhappiness of producers is evidenced by the 
proposed farmers' strike for December 14. And let food prices 
increase. by 1 or 2 percent in a given month, and we will have 
four column headlines on that issue in all our major newspapers. 
So a tremendous educational and informational job remains to be 
done. 
With producers, the major challenge is to explain that 
basic income protection is to be achieved through target prices 
and not through loan rates. We simply cannot afford to raise 
loan rates to a point where we lose our international competitiveness. 
Were we to make that mistake, the results would be devastating. 
We did make that mistake in the 1950's and 60's, and the results 
were devastating - but farmers have short memories! 
From the producers' standpoint, we also have the question 
of dealing with indexes. For years, the basic farm policy goal 
of most farmers was to achieve parity. Anyone with a smattering 
of knowledge on the subject knows that parity is an outmoded 
concept, but it has taken half a century to work our way out of 
that bind, and we still have not fully done so. 
"Cost of production" seems now to be in vogue as an index 
alternative to parity. But it too has its shortcomings, particularly 
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when one attempts to include fixed costs such as land in the 
definition. If cost of production is to be used as a base for 
determining target prices in the future, it will have to be 
refined a whole lot more than has been done to date. 
One of the principal educational challenges in the domestic 
farm policy arena lies with achieving an understanding of the 
numerous trade-offs that are required, and how, when, and where 
they are made. For example, target prices are a trade-off between 
producers and taxpayers. The higher the level, the greater the 
income protection for farmers, but the potential price tag is 
obviously higher. Consumers are a part of that trade-off too, 
for higher target prices presumably will stimulate increased 
production by farmers and lower food prices for consumers, at 
least in the long run. Loan rates involve an even more complex 
set of trade-offs, because of their international implications. 
If and when our loan rates exceed world market prices, we tend 
to isolate ourselves from that market. To the extent we do so 
by increasing our own stocks, supply elsewhere is reduced (at 
least in the short run) and food prices will tend to rise. Thus, 
consumers in other nations are adversely affected by our policies, 
and so are U.S. consumers unless the government is prepared to 
move the stocks into the market place at a loss. If that is done, 
taxpayers become involved in the trade-off since they must bear 
the losses. Taxpayers are involved too in bearing the storage 
costs. Producers are temporary beneficiaries, for they can sell 
their product at no less than the loan ra~e, which presumably is 
above the equilibrium market price. Then there are short run and 
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long run trade·-offs. High loan rates in the U.S. are likely to 
stimulate additional production in the U.S. and elsewhere, leading 
to surpluses a few years down the road, with a concomitant 
decrease in farm prices and perhaps (but with less assurance) 
also a decrease in food prices. A set-aside program or other 
production restraints may, of course, be used to reduce the 
pressure on target prices and loan rates. If production is 
successfully restrained, the market price of agricultural 
products should rise, thereby reducing or eliminating deficiency 
payments to farmers that might otherwise be necessary. Effective 
restraint will also reduce or eliminate government holdings of 
grain under the loan program. Taxpayers will benefit from such 
restraint, particularly if compliance with the restraint program 
can be achieved at little or no cost. Less food will be produced, 
however, so food costs presumably will be higher. Consumers, 
therefore, are likely to have higher food prices and lower taxes. 
Whether they will come out better or worse in the trade-off will 
obviously vary from one household to another. 
Will it not be exceedingly difficult to explain all this to 
a housewife? Of course, but it is worth doing. In a democratic 
society such as ours, one must assume that a higher level of 
knowledge will lead to more reasonable and rational policy making. 
B. Consumer Relations - Consumer relations are an inherent 
element of the agricultural policy trade-offs that I have just 
discussed. But there are other aspects of your relationship with 
the consumer sector that demand attention too. Food is a bargain in 
the United States; it has been for many years, and will probably be 
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so for years to come. But that point has not been well made. 
Most housewives are just not convinced, even when they are 
told that on the average only 16 percent of their family budget 
goes for food. Somehow we need to raise that level of understanding 
too. Just think what it would mean to the agricultural sector 
of this country if American housewives willingly adjusted their 
spending priorities and boosted food to the 20 percent level. 
Consumers are also concerned about health risks today. They 
have had a constant bombardment of material on- the risks of 
carcinogens, hormones, additives, cholesterol, and a whole host 
of similar items, all of which are health related in some way. 
The issues have been senationalized in the press, and many of 
the studies have been either inconsistent or of questionable 
validity. One must always wonder about the accuracy of interpolating· 
laboratory results involving test animals to a real world situation 
involving human beings. Nevertheless, we in agriculture are sometimes 
too wont to dismiss these concerns out of hand, rather than facing 
up to them. We are often too much on the defensive, and insufficiently 
responsive to the legitimate concerns of our fellow man. It is 
imperative that we meet these issues head on, with full recognition 
that these are concerns of customers of ours, which therefore must 
be satisfied. 
In some areas of consumer interest, the pendulum of response 
has gone all the way to the other extreme. In other words, we have 
probably begun to do too much for consumers, rather than too little. 
For example, we may eventually have so much background material 
on consumer labels that the American housewives will become totally 
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confused. Those housewives are intelligent people, and they 
have unquestionably been underinformed, if not misinformed, in 
the past. But their time has a value too, so let us not inundate 
them with information that will be of little value in their 
purchasing decisions. 
Finally, those of us in the agricultural sector need to learn 
how to communicate effectively with consumer groups. We spend far 
too much time talking to each other about how efficient we are, 
and what a magnificent production and marketing system we have. 
But how many of us have communicated directly and openingly with 
the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, or any of 
the other major consumer advocate groups. There is a lot for us 
to learn in understanding consumers, whether they be militant or 
not, and still more for us to learn in communicating our story 
to them. As Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Carol Foreman 
has often said, it would be well for farmers, consumers, and even 
the illusive "middlemen" to spend more time emphasizing their 
mutual interests rather than their points of conflict. 
C. The Middleman - In general, both producers and 
consumers stand high in public opinion in this country. Both 
are able to engender a great deal of political support for their 
views and in response to their problems. The 11 middleman 11 on the 
other hand, see~s always to be the villian of the piece. Whether 
he be a processor, a transporter, a distributor, or the performer 
of any other function in the marketing process, he is chastised 
when food prices rise. The middleman is criticized for being 
inefficient, monopolistic, predatory, and the perpetrator of 
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nearly every economic ill known to our capitalistic system. 
In the vast majority of cases, this criticism is totally unfair 
and ill-founded. But it is a fact of life nevertheless, and the 
agribusiness entities involved have a most serious image problem 
which must be confronted. 
Without question, we have the best agricultural marketing 
system in the world. It can be improved, of course, but so can 
anything. This has been an amazingly innovative segment of the 
food chain, characterized by excellent responsiveness to consumer 
demands. Processing, packaging, and distribution techniques have 
all changed tremendously over the past several years. Yet, for 
some reason, all these improvements, innovations, and imaginative 
new techniques are rarely attributed to the "middleman". Our 
processing and marketing firms simply have not received credit 
for their accomplishments. That too is an educatfonal process, 
but it must be coupled with still further advancements in the 
future. Like everyone else, consumers want to know what we have 
done for them today! That means that we must continue our research 
and development efforts in all phases of the marketing process -
new packaging techniques, such as boxed beef, new means for extending 
shelf life, such as irradiation; improved acceptability of 
preservation techniques, such as freezing; increased transportation 
efficiency through improvements in the regulatory process (the 
backhaul issue, for example), etc. 
D. The Fast Food Phenomenon - The most spectacular 
splash on the food marketing scene in recent years has come from 
the fast food industry. This has been an incredible development, 
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with enormous implications for all of us. Those implications 
can be turned into exceedingly profitable opportunities if we 
adjust to what has transpired and will continue to transpire. 
But we will have to adjust quickly and decisively, or the world 
will pass us by. In my judgment, the fast food business is not 
a short-term fad. It very likely represents a permanent and 
..z.. 
induring shift in the food consumption habits of the American 
people. Perhaps even more importantly, that shift is already 
making itself known in many other countries. 
The shotgun approach to production and marketing simply 
will not work in the fast food sector. The demand at the retail 
level is for large volumes of particular food products, produ~ed 
and processed in accordance with detailed specifications. This is 
the rifle approach, of course, and those of us in the food chain 
will have to respond with pinpoint accuracy to our customers' 
needs. Those who do so will have an opportunity to share in the 
spectacular earnings of one of our most dynamic economic sectors. 
Those who are unable to do so will likely find themselves subject 
to a shrinking market in years to come. 
E. New Technology - I would be remiss if I were to 
close a session such as this without emphasizing the continued 
need for technological advances in the production and marketing 
sector. I have already alluded to the latter, but let us not 
forget the former even though we are presently in a surplus situation. 
The energy crisis will adversely affect agricultural production in 
this country and elsewhere for many years to come. We must adjust 
to that distasteful fact in a variety of ways. Some of those ways 
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are already at hand. Minimum tillage is perhaps the most obvious. 
But there are others; for example, we already knew- how to produce 
crops with a lot less irrigation water than has typically been 
applied. And we certainly know how to harvest crops for ensilage, 
rather than expending vast amounts of energy to dry thBm. But there 
are undoubtedly additional advancements in both production and 
management techniques that could further reduce the consumption 
of energy on the farm. The same will undoubtedly hold for such 
usage in the processing and marketing areas of the food chain. 
Finally, there is a great need for improved technology and 
management in the marketing decisions of farmers. Due at least 
partially to our earlier agricultural policies, farmers have 
always concentrated primarily on production and secondarily 
on marketing. The latter was not very difficult or challenging, 
of course, so long as the government was the major buyer, and 
this was done at essentially a fixed price. Now, however, the 
government is less involved in the marketing decisions of individual 
farmers, and this makes it essential that those farmers learn how 
to evaluate market conditions, hedge their risks, etc. There are 
already many techniques available - forward contracting, use of 
the futures markets, pooling, etc. But we have just scratched the 
surface with these. In the language of the computer world, we are 
just in the first generation of agricultural marketing models. 
Both the academic world and the business world have a major role 
to play in moving to a second and third generation of farm marketing 
techniques. I expect that we will see a tremendous evolution in 
this entire area over the next five or ten years. If we do this job 
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well, the entire food chain will operate more effectively than 
it does today. 
III. Conclusion 
There are many other isuses which could be covered. For 
example, the whole subject of nutrition is receiving increased 
emphasis at the Federal level today. So is the matter of 
increased competition in all our industries. We have talked 
little about improving conversion ratios in our livestock and 
poultry sector. Much more could be said about featherbedding 
and other labor practices that reduce efficiency and hamper 
technological change. But I believe we have touched on most of 
the major issues of the day. If agricultural businesses and 
academic institutions in Minnesota and elsewhere will work 
together on problems and issues such as these, we should be able 
to promise the people of this nation and the world a constantly 
improving food industry. 
Good luck! 
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